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SOME ASPECTS OF PRICE CONTROL IN WARTIME
PAUL F. HANNAHt
Uncle Sam is about to receive his first baptism by almost total immersion
in price control. Passage of H. R. 5479, the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1941, was, at the time of going to press, expected within a few weeks.
Uncle Sam has been sprinkled, at different times, and in many of his sov-
ereign states, with price control.' He waded up to his knees in the Jordan of
price-fixing in World War I. Whether the immersion method now con-
templated, which would leave undunked both agricultural prices and wages,
will, if finally adopted, be more effective in cleansing away the sins of infla-
tion than measures taken heretofore, the future must decide.2
Price-fixing in World War I, and during World War II in England and
Canada, serves as prologue to the measure America will soon find shaking
her entire economy.
I. PRICE CONTROL DURING WORLD WAR I
Price control authority during World War I was given to a variety of
government agencies. None except the Fuel Administration and the Food
Administration had express statutory authority for price-fixing. Maximum
prices were regulated by the War Industries Board, the Price-Fixing Com-
mittee, the Food and Fuel Administrations, the Emergency Fleet Corpora-
tion, the Railway Administration, the War and Navy Departments, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Agriculture.8
Of these price-fixing agencies, the War Industries Board and its successor,
the Price-Fixing Committee, were perhaps the most important.
A. Price Regulation by the War Industries Board and the Price-Fixing
Committee
On July 28, 1917, the Council of National Defense, created by the Na-
tThe writer wishes to express his appreciation for the assistance of Brunson Mac-
Chesney, Assistant General Counsel of the Office of Price Administration, and for the
assistance of the office of Senator. Robert Taft, in making available various memoranda.
1See Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 6 F. Supp. 297 (S. D. N. Y. 1934), aff'd, 293
U. S. 163; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934) ; United States
v. Morgan, 61 Sup. Ct. 999 (1941). For history of price fixing during the Revolutionary
War, see (1920) 33 HARv. L. Ruv. 838-841; McAllister, Price Control By Law in the
United States (1937) 4 LAW AND CONT. PROB. 273-300; Clark, Emergency Legislation
Prior to December 1917, U. S. Justice Dept., G. P. 0. 1918; Pennsylvania Acts, 1777, p. 59.
2For divergent opinions, see A. Wyn Williams, We Can Learn About Price Fixing
from England (1941) 29 NAT. Bus., 40-42; 0. P. A. Release, PM 1421 (Oct. 22, 1941) ;
Effects of the Defense Program on Prices, Wages and Profits (Sept. 30, 1941) Brookings
Institution.
SGarrett, Government Control over Prices (1920) G. P. 0., 38.
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tional Defense Act of August 29, 1916, 4 established the War Industries
Board to co-ordinate the war effort and gave it specific directions "to con-
sider price factors."
Previously, the General Munitions Board, created on March 31, 1917, had
been authorized, by the Secretary of War to determine fair and just prices
to be paid by the government, and in emergencies had fixed specific prices.
The War Industries Board went further and exercised price controls over a
number of basic raw materials, including copper, iron, steel, cement, lumber,
zinc, and aluminum. Its price-fixing functions were theoretically all taken
over by the Price-Fixing Committee on March 4th, when the President, in
reconstituting the Board and redefining its function as the co-ordinator of
the war effort, provided that the Board, "in the determination of prices ...
should be governed by the advice of a committee." The Board, made inde-
pendent of the National Council of Defense on May 28, 1918, continued
in fact to exercise controls over prices of many commodities. The Com-
mittee, concerning itself primarily with fixing prices of production, did so
generally only after conferences with the industries involved. It began as
an advisory body concerned solely with protecting the government in its
purchases; it ended with protection also of the public, particularly with re-
spect to building materials, wools, and cotton textiles.
Both the War Industries Board and the Price-Fixing Committee accom-
plished their results, for the most part, by negotiating agreements with in-
dustry. Thus, on September 24, 1917, in fixing iron and steel prices the
Board announced:
"The President has approved an agreement between the War Indus-
tries Board and the steel men, fixing the following prices, which became
effective immediately and are subject to revision January 1, 1918." 5
Behind the agreements, however, were the powers to requisition goods, take
439 STAT. 649 (1916).5Hearings before Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941) 52, 56. F. W. Taussig, a member of the Price Fixing Committee of the War
Industries Board, has stated:
"The prices fixed were in all cases reached by agreement with the representa-
tives of the several industries. In strictness they were agreed prices rather
than fixed prices. The agreements were usually reached in cordial co-operation
with the producers concerned, and thus were, in reality, voluntary. There were
cases, however, in which they were agreements only in name. The representa-
tives of some industries, though they accepted them, did so virtually under
duress. In these cases the Committee to all intents and purposes decreed prices
and was enabled to impose them, under the form of agreement, by a more or less
veiled threat of commandeering, and also by the certainty that public opinion
would condemn those who failed to accede." (Garrett, Government Control Over
Prices (1920) G. P. 0., 239).
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over plants, or to place commandeering orders, and these powers as well as
the war time spirit, doubtless helped to bring agreement.
6
Occasionally, however, prices were fixed without calling in the industry or
without its agreement. For example, on August 19, 1918, the Fair Price
Committee by order7 fixed maximum prices on woolen rags, the prices to be
subject to revision in 10 weeks after investigation by the Federal Trade
Commission.
Robert S. Brookings, Chairman of the Price-Fixing Committee, plainly
informed producers on July 9, 1918:
"The President has made it perfectly clear to us, that we are not a body
that meets simply for the purpose of registering the wishes of the in-
dustry. That is not what we are appointed for. We do try to agree
with the industry, but failing in that, our instructions are to fix prices,
and if we cannot fix it [sic] by agreement, we have to fix it by order,
although we do not like to do that."'8
Little or no statutory or other express authority existed for price control
by either the War Industries Board or the Price-Fixing Committee.9 The
former was at first a subordinate part of the Council of National Defense,
GAs Mr. Baruch advised the President (Putney, Bryant, Price Control in War Time
(1940) 2 ED. REs. REP., No. 16, 313) :
"The prices imposed upon the steel manufacturers and copper producers, if
resisted, could have been enforced by seizing the mines and factories under power
conferred ... in certain appropriation acts; and the existence of this power was
sufficient to compel obedience to prices without exercising the power."
Mr. Baruch has said in his book (AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, 440):
"We used a good many euphemisms during the war for the sake of national
morale, and this one of 'price fixing by agreement' is a good deal like calling
conscription 'Selective Service' and referring to registrants for the draft as
'mass volunteers'. Let us make no mistake about it: we fixed prices with the aid
of potential Federal compulsion and we could not have obtained unanimous
compliance othervise."
7The peremptory character of the order is indicated by its text:
"The Price Fixing Committee of the War Industries Board has fixed the
following maximum prices upon various grades of rags, effective on all sales
made from August 19, and remaining in effect until October 1, 1918, and there-
after, pending the compilation of data which is to be furnished by the Federal
Trade Commission. These prices are net f.o.b. shipping points and are to apply
to sales made both to the Government and to the public." (Minutes, Price Fixing
Committee, August 19, 1918. Senate Committee Print, No. 5, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1095).
SMinutes of the War Industries Board, Senate Committee Print, No. 4, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., 352.
9At various times it has been claimed that the following acts, read together, imply
the power exercised: Council of National Defense Act, 39 STAT. 649 (1916), 10 U. S. C.
§ 1393 (1916) ; Naval Emergency Fund Act, 39 STAT. 1168; Emergency Shipping Fund
Act, 40 STAT. 182; Food Control Act, 40 STAT. 276 (1917), 43 U. S. C. § 431 note (1917) ;
National Defense Act, 39 STAT. 166 (1916), 10 U. S. C. §§ 2, 4, 5 (1916) ; Espionage Act,
40 STAT. 225 (1917), 22 U. S. C. §§ 243, 244, 245 (1917) ; Trading-with-the-Enemy Act,
40 STAT. 411 (1917), 34 U. S. C. § 1 (1917), and the Overman Act, 40 STAT. 553
(1918), 50 U. S. C. § 33 note (1918).
1941]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
created as a peace time planning board by the Act of August 29, 1916,10
mainly to "supervise and direct investigations and make recommendations"
on national defense matters. Possibly within its powers was "the creation
of relations which will render possible in time of need the immediate con-
centration and utilization of the resources of the nation," although the
grammatical construction employed would indicate that it could only investi-
gate and recommend such creations. But the National Council .was given
no price-fixing authority, and Secretary of War Baker, writing on June 30,
1917, to W. S. Gifford, Director of the Council, protesting the fixing of
coal prices by the Committee on Coal Production, said:
"I, therefore, as President of the Council of National Defense, write
to say that the Council of National Defense has no legal power, and
claims no legal power, either to fix the price of coal, or to fix a maxi-
mum price for coal or any other product."
The War Industries Board acquired no new functions, either under the
Overman Act of May 20, 1918, or by express delegation from the President,
when it was made independent. The Price-Fixing Committee received a
grant of power from neither the Congress nor the President. The President
himself had been given by Congress no price-fixing authority."1
Statutory authority was, however, little missed, and was not even vigorously
sought. The reason is clear. As was stated in the McFarland case:
"For the most part, as in this case, everybody acquiesced in whatever
seemed best to those charged with the immediate responsibility of action.
When growers, dealers, and manufacturers accepted the scale of prices
dictated by the War Industries Board, it is immaterial whether the
Board had or had not any legal power to fix them.
1 2
Parties who accepted contracts stipulating fixed prices could later claim no
"public taking.'1 3 Promises the government had no right to require, such as
the repayment to the government of excess charges, were held to be binding.
14
1039 STAT. 649 (1916), 50 U. S. C. §§ 1-5 (1928).
"1United States v. McFarland, 15 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 4th 1926).
1215 F. (2d) at 838.
' 3American Smelting and Ref. Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 75, 42 Sup. Ct. 420 (1922).
.41n United States v. Smith, 285 Fed. 751 (D. C. Mass. 1922), for example, a
demurrer to a suit brought by the Government to recover an excess commission from
sale of wool to the Government, upon an agreement contained in the permit not to charge
more than this amount, was dismissed, the court saying:
"The defendant was under no compulsion to take a permit (to deal in wool].
He could do so, or not, as he chose. If he had refused, doubtless he would have
been discriminated against by the Board. Balancing advantages against dis-
advantages, it was for him to decide whether he would take a permit or stand
on his rights without one. He took one and made the agreement here in suit.
It was his voluntary act. Hamilton v. Dallin, 21 Wall. 73, 90, 22 L. ed. 528;
Silliman v. United States, 101 U. S. 465, 25 L. ed. 987. It is said in Daniels
v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415, at p. 421 (26 L. ed. 187) that 'where a party has
[Vol. 27
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Thus were the nation's prices regulated twenty years ago: a magnificent
demonstration of the patriotism of the people-and of the exercise of power
to create additional power, the grant of which Congress had withheld.
B. The Food and Fuel Control Act
Soon after the declaration of war on April 6, 1918, the need to increase
and conserve the food and fuel supply for sake of government and public
became apparent. Congress enacted the Food and Fuel Control Act 5 on
August 10, 1917, for "encouraging the production, conserving the supply,
and controlling the distribution of food products and fuel." This Act made
unlawful hoarding, waste, monopolization, and profiteering in foods, feeds,
fuel, fertilizers, and machinery and equipment required to produce these
necessities. It gave the President extensive control, through licensing power,
over importation, production, and distribution, and gave prima facie correct-
ness to his determinations of what were fair prices and charges. The only
prices the President was directly authorized to fix were a reasonable guaran-
teed price for wheat and prices for coal and coke. Wheat prices, the statute
required, had to be based upon a $2.00 basic price for a certain grade. Coal
and coke prices were to be based upon cost of production (including, in
the case of producers, operation and maintenance costs, depreciation, and
depletion) plus a "just and reasonable profit."'u It was expressly stated
that fixation of coke and coal prices was not to invalidate contracts pre-
viously made in good faith.
Control over food was delegated by the President to a Food Administrator,
who operated through federal food administrators in each state and county.
The backbone of control was the license system, and before the war ended
more than 260,000 persons and firms had been brought under license, al-
though the Act exempted from control farm and garden producers and re-
tailers whose gross annual sales fell below $100,000. Although the Act did
not specifically empower, except in the case of wheat, the fixing of either
minimum, absolute, or maximum prices on foodstuffs, the requirement in
licenses that the licensees should not receive more than a "reasonable margin
of profit" coupled with the fi-xing of this margin by the Food Administration,
and the widespread publicity given "fair price" schedules established by price
availed himself for his benefit of an unconstitutional act, he cannot . . . aver
its unconstitutionality as a defense'. The defendant has had the benefit of the
agreement, and I think he should be held to the burden of it. United States v.
Powers (W. D. Mich., July 5, 1921) 274 Fed. 131."
1540 STAT. 279 (1917).
26Some doubt may exist whether factors of cost and profit had to be considered in fixing
fuel prices when the Federal Trade Commission was not used. Cf. MacDonald Coal
Mining Company v. United States, 56 Ct. Cl. 440, 446 (1921) and Highland v. Russell
Car and Snow Plow Co. 279 U. S. 253, 259 (1928).
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interpreting boards and fair price committees, resulted in fact in effective
price control. A majority of the violations were disposed of by state adminis-
trators by requirements of restitution or contribution to Red Cross or Liberty
Bond drives or by temporary suspension of licenses; out of nearly 10,000
cases handled by the Enforcement Division between August 10, 1917, and
December 31, 1918, only 65 resulted in requisition and 72 in criminal
proceedings.
17
The control over coke, coal, and petroleum by the Fuel Administration
followed much the same lines as that over food, especially in the case of
petroleum. The President had been empowered, however, to fix coal and
coke prices, and price-fixing, as might have been expected, was more direct.
No criminal penalties bad been provided in the original Food and Fuel Con-
trol Act in the case of foods, but heavy provisions for fines and imprison-
ment and for the requisitioning of plants and products with respect to coal
and coke gave teeth to price-fixing that could, and did, bite sharply.
In placing price control over coal and coke in the Fuel Administration, the
President ignored the suggestion in the statute that price control over fuel
"may be exercised by him . . . through the agency of the Federal Trade
Commission." He also, in large measure, ignored the provisions of the Act
setting up a price-fixing procedure involving investigation and price deter-
mination by that body.'8 His action, prompted by the belief that for action
administrators were required, was sustained in MacDonald Coal Mining
Co. v. United States.'8s
Fuel price-fixing under Section 25 of the Food and Fuel Control Act
'T Considering the view finally taken by the courts, this perhaps was fortunate. See post,
pp. 28-9.
18The Food and Fuel Control Act (Lever Act) provided in Section 25: "That when
directed by the President, the Federal Trade Commission is hereby required to proceed
to make full inquiry, giving such notice as it may deem practicable, into the cost of
producing under reasonably efficient management at the various places of production
the following commodities, to wit, coal and coke.
"Having completed its inquiry respecting any commodity in any locality, it shall, if
the President has decided to fix the prices at which any, such commodity shall be sold by
producers and dealers generally, fix and publish maximum prices for both producers of
and dealers in any such commodity, which maximum prices shall be observed by all
producers and dealers until further action thereon is taken by the commission.
"In fixing maximum prices for the producers the commission shall allow the cost of
production, including the expense of operation, maintenance, depreciation, and depletion,
and shall add thereto a just and reasonable profit.
"In fixing such prices for dealers the commission shall allow the cost to the dealer and
shall add thereto a just and reasonable sum for his profit in the transaction.
"The maximum prices so fixed and published shall not be construed as invalidating any
contract in which prices are fixed, made in good faith, prior to the establishment and
publication of maximum prices by the commission."
-'56 Ct. Cl. 440 (1921), aff'd on other grounds, 261 U. S. 608, 43 Sup. Ct. 433 (1923).
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received, in the main, judicial blessing in the lower federal courts.19 It was
held by the Supreme Court not to violate the "due process" clause of the
Fifth Amendment under the particular circumstances involved in Highland
v. Russell Car and Snow Plow C0. 20 This case doubtless will be employed
as a precedent sustaining price-fixing in World War II. The Snow Plow
Company defended a claim for a balance owing on coal sold it by the plain-
tiff during the war. It had already paid plaintiff the price fixed by the
Fuel Administration. The Supreme Court, sustaining a judgment for
defendant, stressed, among other things, the provision of the Lever Act,
20°
which it held required, in the fixing of a price, allowance of "a just and
reasonable sum for profit", and the lack of any evidence that "the amount
paid by defendant was not compensatory or that it did not give him a
reasonable profit or that the value of the coal was greater than the prices
fixed by the President,"21 and the facts that defendant was engaged in "a
public use for which coal and other private property might have been taken
by exertion of the power of eminent domain," and that "plaintiff was free
to keep his coal." The Court recognized that:
"Under the Constitution, and subject to the safeguard there set for
the protection of life, liberty and property, the Congress and the Presi-
dent exert the war power of the Nation, and they have wide discretion
as to the means to be employed successfully to carry on,"
and that the price-fixing orders
"here challenged are supported by a strong prdsumption of validity and
they may not be set aside unless dearly shown to be arbitrary and re-
pugnant to the Constitution."
22
A different decision might have been reached in the Highland case had
plaintiff proved he had sold his coal at a loss. Four years before, in another
I 19See for example Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 433 (1920), aff'd on
other grounds, 259 U. S. 191, 42 Sup. Ct. 482 (1922) ; United States v. Pennsylvania
Central Coal Co., 256 Fed. 703 (D. C. Pa., 1918) (upholding an indictment charging a
conspiracy to demand more for coal than the price fixed by the Fuel Administrator);
Ford v. United States, 281 Fed. 298 (C. C. A. 6th 1922).
20279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 279 (1928).20 Section 25, Act of Aug. 10, 1917, 40 STAT. 279 (1917).
21The Supreme Court took it for granted that "prices to be charged by dealers were to
be made by adding to their cost a just and reasonable sum for profit". The Court of
Claims, however, in MacDonald Coal Mining Co. v. United States, 56 Ct. Cl., 440, 446
(1921) took the view that "Congress intended to give the President the broadest discre-
tion in fixing the price and did not intend to hamper or tie him down by requiring him
to pursue a certain method of procedure or to be guided by certain facts and conditions in
fixing the price. If this view of the Act be correct, there is an end of the contention that
in fixing the price, the President was bound to take into consideration certain circum-
stances, namely, the cost of production and a reasonable profit and the plaintiff's claim
that an obligation arose out of the duty to consider these circumstances falls."
2279 U. S. at 261, 262.
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case arising under the Lever Act,23 the Court had carefully avoided deciding
the "grave constitutional question" as to whether "under the existing cir-
cumstances .... Congress [had] power to fix prices at which persons then
owning coal must sell thereafter, if they sold at all, without providing com-
pensation for losses." Certainly the Highland case does not sustain price-
fixing in all its aspects. The Court did, in Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United
States,24 and Pine Hill Coal Co. v. Uvited States,25 definitely resolve any
doubt as to whether price-fixing, unaccompanied by a requirement that the
owner sell his price-fixed goods and in the absence of proof that the prices
fixed were unfair, constitutes, in the case of sales to third parties, a public
taking making the government liable for just compensation. Denying the
assertion that either the Lever Act or the Fifth Amendment resulted in an
express or implied promise on the part of the government to reimburse
losses, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, said:
"We see no ground for the claim. The claimant, in consequence of
the regulation mentioned, sold some of its coal to other parties at a less
price than what otherwise it would have got. That is all. It now
seeks to hold the Government answerable for making a rule that it saw
fit to obey. Whether the rule was valid or void no such consequence
follows. Making the rule was not a taking, and no law making power
promises by implication to make good losses that may be incurred by
obedience to its commands. If the law requires a party to give up prop-
erty to a third person without adequate compensation, the remedy is, if
necessary, to refuse to obey it, not to sue the lawmaker. The statute
provides remedies against the Government in other cases, but the claim-
ant argues that this case does not fall within them, and it did not follow
the steps prescribed for them. The petition does not even allege that
the price the claimant got was not a fair one, but only that if the Gov-
ernment had not issued the regulation, it would have got more under
its contract. Considerably more than that is needed before a promise
of indemnity from the Government can be implied."'26
The attempt made in Section 4 of the Lever Act to make illegal "unrea-
sonable" and excessive charges for food and fuel did not fare as well as the
definite price-fixing provisions regarding fuel.
The original Section 4 was held not to support an indictment because no
penalty was prescribed therein for its violation.2 7 This defect was cured by
amendment to the Act on October 22, 1919.28 This Act also added wearing
23Matthew Addy Co. v. United States, 264 U. S. 239, 245, 44 Sup. Ct. 300, 302 (1924).
24259 U. S. 188, 42 Sup. Ct. 481 (1922).
25259 U. S. 191, 42 Sup. Ct. 482 (1922).
2 6 Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 188, 190, 42 Sup. Ct. 481 (1922).27Mossew v. United States, 266 Fed. 18 (C. C. A. 2d 1920) ; United States v. Arm-
strong, 265 Fed. 683 (D. Ind. 1920).
2841 STAT. 297 (1919).
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apparel to the list of necessaries, and brought within the realm of price-
fixing rents in the District of Columbia, upheld as a war emergency measure
in Block v. Hirsh,29 on the ground that the war had "clothed the letting of
buildings in the District of Columbia with a public interest so great as to
justify regulation by law." Then, after a number of courts had held the
new Section 4 constitutional,3 ° even though enacted after the cessation of
hostilities,31 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.,82
rejected it on the ground that its language, "it is hereby made unlawful
for any person willfully . . to make any unjust or unreasonable
rate or charge in handing or dealing in or with any necessaries," was so
vague and indefinite as to amount to an unconstitutional attempt to delegate
to courts and juries the legislative power. These words did not, the Court
said, fix an ascertainable standard of guilt or adequately inform persons
accused of violation of the law of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them. 33
By the time Section 4 was held unconstitutional, however, the war had
been won, and the section had accomplished its purpose. The Food Ad-
ministr'ation, dependent to a considerable extent on the section, had, for
example, kept wholesale sugar prices in the United States down to a 17%
rise between August, 1917, to November, 1918, while in the same period
they had risen 157% in France and 94% in England; and it had achieved
corresponding results in the case of bread, canned and dried foods, and
other commodities.3 4 Thus had "the law's delay", so complained of in the
'thirties, helped a control that participated in victory, and had an unconstitu-
tional enactment helped to preserve and defend the Constitution.
20256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921).
3 0United States v. Oglesby Grocery Co., 264 Fed. 691 (D. C. Ga. 1920); Kuenster
\v. Meredith, 264 Fed. 243 (D. C. Ill. 1920); United States v. Mulligan, 268 Fed. 893
(D. C. N. Y. 1920) ; United States v. Rosenblum, 264 Fed. 578 (D. C. Pa. 1920) ; C. A.
\Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 264 Fed. 453 (W. D. N. Y. 1920); Willard Co. v. Palmer
(not reported) ; Weeds, Inc. v. United States (N. D. N. Y., not reported) ; Kennington
v. Palmer (S. D. Miss., not reported) ; Tedrow v. Lewis & Sons Dry Goods Co. (D. C.
Colo., not reported).3 1United States v. Swedlow, 264 Fed. 1016 (D. C. Colo. 1920); United States v.
Russell, 265 Fed. 414 (D. C. La. 1920) ; United States v. Armstrong, 265 Fed. 683 (D. C.
Ind. 1920).
32255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298 (1921).
33The Court said (255 U. S. at p. 89) : " . . . to attempt to enforce the Section would
be the exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized
and punished all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreasonable
in the estimation of the court and jury." It further said (255 U. S. at p. 92) that to
hold the statute constitutional would be to hold that: " . . . no standard whatever was
required, no information as to the nature and cause of the accusation was essential, and
that it was competent to delegate legislative power, in the very case of the settled
significance of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and of other plainly applicable pro-
visions of the Constitution."




II. PRICE CONTROL IN WORLD WAR II IN ENGLAND
In England, the Defense (General) Regulation 5 adopted in September,
1939, by order in Council pursuant to the powers granted by the Emergency
Powers (Defense) Act,36 provided for complete economic mobilization, in-
cluding complete price control. Section 55 of the Regulation provided that
"a competent authority,"37
"may by order -provide: (a) for regulating or prohibiting the produc-
tion, treatment, keeping, storage, movement, transport, distribution, dis-
posal, acquisition, use or consumption of articles of any description, and,
in particular, for controlling the prices at which such articles may be
sold;
"(b) for regulating the carrying on of any undertaking engaged in es-
sential work, and, in particular, for controlling the charges which may
be made by the undertakers in respect of the doing of any work by
them; ... "
The Regulation further empowered "any competent authority" to require the
keeping of books and records and their production, to inspect plants and
premises, to institute any scheme of control deemed "necessary or expedient,"
or to require a license as a condition precedent to doing "anything regulated
by the order," which license might be made to apply
"either to persons or undertakings generally or to any particular per-
son or undertaking or class of persons or undertakings, and either to
the whole or any part of any undertaking, and so as to have effect
either generally or in any particular area."
Price controls, originally exercised by the Board of Trade (corresponding
to our Secretary of Commerce) soon after the war began, were divided
between the Minister of Food, the Minister of Supply, in charge of indus-
trial supplies; the Minister of Health, enforcing the rent "freezing" Rent,
and Mortgage Restriction Act; and the Board of Trade, operating in the
"goods" field.38 The result of divided authority, coupled with apparent re-
35S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 927.36The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act provided in part as follows:
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, His Majesty may by order in
Council make such Regulations (in this Act referred to as Defence Regulations)
as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for securing the public safety,
the defence of the realm, the maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecu-
tion of any war in which His Majesty may be engaged, and for maintaining
supplies and services essential to the life of the community."37Regulation 49 designated as "a competent authority" either a "Secretary of State,
the Admiralty, the Board of Trade, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, the
Minister of Health, the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Supply, the Minister of
Home Security, the Minister of Shipping, the Minister of Food, the Postmaster General
and the Commissioners of Works". Slightly different provisions for competent authori-
ties were made in the case of Scotland and Northern Ireland.38See Ministers of the Crown (Minister of Food) Order 1939, S. R. & 0. 1939, No.
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luctance to cover all materials and products, and further, the fact that wages,
untouched by the acts, are to a considerable extent closely tied to the cost
of living in England, has been in the eyes of some critics80 unfortunate and
chaotic. It is pointed out that in the first four months of World War II,
prices in England advanced more than they did in the first fifteen months
of World War 1.8
The cheaper rents, however, have not increased. Rents of working and
lower middle-class dwellings (i.e., dwellings bripging an annual rental in
London of £100 or less, Scotland £90 or less, and elsewhere £75 or less)
were frozen on September 1, 1939, by the Rent and Mortgage Restrictions
Act at their then existing levels for the duration of the war and for six
months afterward.
The "freezing" process was not adopted, however, in the case of food,
goods, and raw materials, control of only the first two of which are here
discussed.
Food control has operated through rationing, price and distribution or-
ders40 of the Minister of Foods, enforced through the licensing and other
powers of local food committees. The latter, set up in every local authority
area by the Food Control Committee Order of September 1, 1939,41 are
each composed of fifteen members, five representing the food trades and
ten (two of whom must be women), the public.
Each food committee was given in September, 1939, the power of en-
forcing within its area all the existing and future orders of the Minister
of Foods 42 and of licensing all food retailers dealing in specified foods.
43
Wide discretion was given the committees as to the terms of the licenses,
and violations of those terms were made offenses against the Defense Regu-
lations. Later, on November 3, 1939, the committees were ordered 4 4 to
%fegister all caterers, boarding houses, and other establishments using bacon,
ham, and butter, and by a subsequent order, meat and sugars.
1119 (Sept. 8, 1939); Ministers of the Crown (Minister of Food) (2) Order 1939
(Oct. 13, 1939) ; Ministry of Supply Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. VI, c. 38; S. R. & 0. 1939,
Nos. 877, 1298; Rents and Mortgage Restriction Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. VI, c. 71, and
A. Wyn Williams, We Can Learn- About Price-Fixing from England (1941) 29 NAT.
Bus., 40-42.
39A. Wyn Williams, loc. cit. supra note 38.
40For examples of price fixing orders, see S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 1172 (for butter)
S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 1104 (for canned salmon) ; S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 1212 (for condensed
milk) ; S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 1170 (for eggs) ; S. R. & 0. 1939, Nos. 1127 and 1130 (for
fat stock), and S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 1040 (for meat).
41S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 1019.
42S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 1250.
43S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 1312. Specified foods were bacon, biscuits, bread, breakfast
cereals, butter, cakes, cheese, chocolate and confectioneries, cocoa, coffee, compound lard,
cream, fats, eggs, fish, flour, fruit, hams, honey, jams, lard, margarine, meats, milk,
potatoes, poultry, game and rabbits, rice, sausages, sugar, syrup, tea and vegetables.
44S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 1553.
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The Minister of Foods, in fixing prices, seems to have almost absolute dis-
cretion and to be bound by no procedural requirements other than he chooses
to set. Neither he nor his food control committees, so far as it has been
possible to discover from the decided cases examined, have been shorn by
judicial action of any of their great powers.
Prices of goods have, since November 16, 1939, been regulated under the
Price of Goods Act45 by the Board of Trade. On July 22, 1941, services
and second-hand goods were brought under the Board's jurisdiction by
enactment of the Goods and Services (Price Control) Act.
46
The Price of Goods Act made it unlawful to sell, agree to sell, or offer 47 to
sell any "price-regulated goods" (i.e., such goods as the Board thought should
be regulated) 48 above a "permitted price." The "permitted price" was the price
the seller was asking for the goods on August 21, 1939, unless the Board
selected one or more other basic dates or permitted an increase in the price.
Price increases might be allowed "on the application of any body of persons
appearing to the Board of Trade to be representative of traders in goods
of any description, or on the application with respect to goods of any de-
scription of the central price regulation committee."
Certain factors of cost and expense (but not profit) 49 and such additional
factors as the Board felt applicable had to be considered in fixing increases.
Any price-fixing order could be appealed "at the instance of any persons
appearing to the Board to be representative of traders in, or buyers of, goods
of the description in question" to a referee appointed by the Lord Chancel-
lor from the English bar by giving fourteen days' notice to the Board. The
Act gave the referee broad authority, subject to such regulations as the Lord
452 & 3 Geo. VI, c. 118 (1939).
464 & 5 Geo. VI, c. 31 (1940).
47By Section 20 of the Act, it was made clear that a mere notification by the seller,
of the price proposed by him for a sale of the goods, even though not technically afi"offer", was within the Act. Section 20 was clarified by the Goods and Services
(Price Control) Act to bring within the Act notifications of price given in such circum-
stances that "the buyer is liable to pay a reasonable price therefor."
48Goods sold at auction and goods for export were exempted from the application
of the Act, except when ordered to be included by the Board of Trade The Board moved
slowly in bringing goods under the Act. By S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 1813 (Dec. 18, 1939)
it designated as "price-regulated goods" clothing, household goods, including glassware,
pottery, cutlery and household textiles, knitting yarn, sand bags, and certain textiles
and leather materials. For most of these goods, the Board fixed specific prices.4 9Factors specified in the statute included: expense of manufacturing, cost of premises
and plant, expenses of maintenance of and improvements on plant; rent; insurance;
wages and salaries; administration and establishment expense; liability for taxes, customs
and interest; transport charges; advertising; provisions for bad debt; and total volume
of business. (Schedule I, Price of Goods Act, 1939). The Board added as factors,
liability under valid contracts for purchase at fixed prices for future delivery (S. R.
& 0. 1940, No. 296) ; sums representing reasonable remuneration for services rendered
in connection with the business (S. R. & 0., 1940, No. 978) ; and levies and rebates
granted to raise sums for maintenance of export trade (S. R. & 0., 1940, No. 1319).
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Chancellor should make, over appeal procedure. The referee could take addi-
tional evidence, if he liked. The Act did not prohibit him from deciding
solely on the record before the Board or from following his own inde-
pendent investigation. The referee was required, however, to consult with
one assessor from each of the three panels set up under the Act in deciding
any appeal. One panel consisted of persons with banking and accounting
experience; the second, of persons with technical knowledge of trading; and
the third, of persons qualified to represent the interest of buyers of goods.
Local price regulation committees were set up by the Act to watch and
recommend prices and to hear complaints.
A complaint 0 had to be filed within seven days of the complained of
transaction. The offender, if the case was felt to be worth an investigation,
was given a hearing if he wished it.
Violations established to the local committee's satisfaction were reported
to the central price-fixing committee, set up to secure uniformity in the
actions of the local committees. This central committee, after investigating
the case itself, could request the Board of Trade to institute prosecution.
Only the Board at the request of the central price-fixing committee, or the
Director of Public Prosecution when the local price regulation committee
had failed to act or the Board had requested prosecution, could institute
actions.
Heavy fines and sentences were provided by the Act. Third offenders
were subject to loss of their right to carry on their businesses.
Originally, Section 9 limited the seller's defense (except in the case of a
servant or agent who could defend on the ground that he had acted solely
on instructions) to proving that the price at which the goods were sold
did not exceed the "permitted price." This section, read with Section 18,
,made it clear that proof of guilty knowledge was not necessary for convic-
tion . 1 A master might be liable although not aware of the sale, or although
he had taken all precautions against the Act.52 This somewhat harsh provi-
sion was modified in the Goods and Services (Price Control) Act, to make
available the defense that the Act was committed without the accused's con-
sent or connivance and that the accused had exercised all diligence to prevent
its commission. 53
50According to the procedure established on January 10, 1940 by S. R. & 0. 1940, No. 25.
51Cf. Pearks, Grenston & Lee, Ltd. v. Ward (1902) 2 K. B. 1; Pearks Dairies, Ltd. v.
Tottenham Food Control Committee, (1918) 88 L. J. K. B. 623.52See Mousell Bros. v. L. & N. W. Ry. (1917) 2 K. B. 836; Andrews v. Tucken (1917)
117 L. T. 726.53Section 16 of the Goods and Services (Price Control) Act reads in part as follows:
"Where a person, not being a body corporate, is charged with an offense under
any provision of this Act which expressly provides that the person carrying on a
1941 ]
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Sellers under both the Price of Goods Act and the Goods and Services
(Price Control) Act are'required to sell their goods to those offering the
"permitted price," except where unusual quantities are desired, or orderly
disposal of goods would be interfered with, or some breach of legal obliga-
tion would result. It is illegal for a master or servant either to deny that
the goods are in stock if in fact they are, or to mislead a buyer as to whether
he has the goods, or to offer the goods upon condition that other goods be
bought.
Buyers from convicted sellers, whether of the goods involved or of simi-
lar goods, may, with certain limitations, either rescind the sale or sue to re-
cover the loss from the overcharge, with 5% interest.
The amendatory Goods and Services (Price Control) Act of January 22,
1941, empowered the Board. among other things, to establish maximum prices
(instead of merely to increase prices from the pre-war base price) ; to fix
prices for services ;54 to license dealers in, and fix prices for, second-hand
goods; to regulate resales by "middlemen"; and to prevent payment of re-
muneration to salesmen of rationed goods. It was authorized to take into
account such factors as it wished in considering price increases, and to take
into account different factors in different businesses; but a draft of each
order relating to price factors had first to be approved by resolution of each
house of Parliament.
Parliament reached back for some of the power it had granted by also re-
quiring each order not relating to price factors to be laid before Parliament,
which within forty days could annul the order, "without prejudice, however,
to the validity of anything previously done thereupon or the making of a
new order."55
The added enforcement provisions indicate a growing concern with vio-
lations and the need for closing loopholes. Inspectors were provided for.
Invoices might be required and buyers were ordered to demand invoices
"where price controlled goods are sold in the course of a business and bought
in the course of another business." The Board was empowered to specify
bookkeeping methods. Sellers of two or more articles or services for a
lump sum had to state specifically the amount charged for each. Exchanges
of goods for goods were forbidden.
business shall be guilty of an offense under this Act, it shall be a defense for him
to prove that the Act or default in respect to which he is charged was committed
by some other person without his consent or connivance, and that he exercised
all such diligence to prevent the commission of the act or default as he ought
to have exercised, having regard to all the circumstances."
_54Services were defined by Section 20 to include the hiring of goods and the sub-
jecting of goods to process. This definition, however, does not include salaries or
wages, and does not bring them within the Act.
55§ 17, Goods and Services (Price Control) Act.
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Price control today in England goes far beyond the price regimentation
in World War I in the United States. The ministers are price "legislators"
subject only to the veto of Parliament. The food control committees have
sweeping regulatory power from the arbitrary exercise of which no statutory
appeal is provided. Local price committees have also great powers subject
to little check. But characteristically, great care is being exercised to sift
and resift complaints and charges, giving each accused at least two oppor-
tunities to be heard by quasi-judicial or judicial bodies. The fundamental
concept of the judicial process, which "proceeds upon inquiry and hears be-
fore it condemns," appears to have been observed. Few complaints of arbi-
trary action have reached this side of the Atlantic, though doubtless inequi-
ties have occurred. The loudest complaint is that the control has not been
sufficiently rigid and drastic effectively to combat rising prices. Thus does
democracy bear lightly shackles of regimentation when her survival requires it.
III. PRICE-FIXING IN CANADA
In Canada, by Order in Council, the War Time Prices and Trade Board
was set up under the War Measures Act 55' shortly after' the war began and
was given broad power to fix prices, ration, and requisition. Certain price
control authority was and is also exercised by the Oil Controller.
Up to a few weeks ago, a selective system of price control covering few
commodities was in operation. The most extensive regulation was in the
coal industry, which was largely operating under license. In December,
1940, the Dominion exercised control over wages and tied wages to the cost
of living in all the war industries.
On October 18, 1941, Premier MacKenzie King announced that on and
after November 17, 1941, no person might sell any goods at a price higher
than the maximum charged by him for such goods or services during the
four weeks from September 15 to October 11, 1941. No employer in
Canadian industry or commerce might, he said, increase his present basic
wage rate without permission. The principle of price ceilings was to be ap-
plied to agriculture.15
By an Order in Council promulgated October 25, 1941, 57 a National War
Labor Board was established to regulate wages in all industries. Without
permission of the Board, no employer may increase his basic wage scale.
The Board may, if it finds the rates in a particular business low as com-
pared to similar businesses in the locality, "prescribe such increased wage
5C. 206, REv. STAT. Canada (1927).
56N. Y. Times, October 19, 1941, Vol. XCL, No. 30584, p. 1.57Montreal Gazette, October 27, 1941, Vol. CLXX, No. 257.
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rates as it finds fair and reasonable." Payment to wage-earners of cost-of-
living bonuses measured by the cost of living index for the Dominion as a
whole as prepared by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics is made mandatory.
A bonus of 250 per week in the case of certain employees and 1% of the
basic wage in the case of others is to be paid for each rise of one point in
the index. Should the index drop, similar decreases in the bonuses take
place. Redeterminations of the bonus must be made quarterly. Collective
bargaining agreements not in conformity with the Order must be made to
conform before January 1, 1942.
The Maximum Price Regulations, promulgated on November 1, 1941571 to
"freeze" prices of goods and services in accordance with the Premier's an-
nouncement, places sweeping powers in the hands of the War Time Prices
and Trade Board. The Board may, under the regulations, "vary any maxi-
mum price, . . .prescribe other or additional terms or conditions of sale,
* . .exempt any person or any goods or services of any transaction" from
the regulations, or withdraw any exemptions. No federal, provincial, or
other price fixing authority may fix or approve specific, minimum, or maxi-
mum prices or markups with respect to any goods or services without the
Board's written concurrence. The Board is to be the sole judge of what
shall constitute, or be included in, any price, rate, rental, or charge. Heavy
fines and prison sentences may be imposed to punish violations of the regu-
lations, or of "any order or requirement of the Board."
The regulations, of course, forbid sales after November 17th at prices
higher than those at which the seller sold the same or similar goods during
the basic period cited by Premier King. But quantity or other discounts
below the maximum customarily and lawfully given must be continued.
Further, prices above the maximum stipulated in contracts made before or
after the basic period must be reduced to the maximum.
No one may, without risk of fine and imprisonment, buy or offer to buy
goods at prices higher than the maximum; but if he does, notwithstanding
his offense, he may recover the excess from his seller.
The regulations cover all "articles, commodities, substances or things,"
and a long list of services ;57b but excluded from the maximum price restric-
tions of the regulations are sales: for export; to the Department of Muni-
57'Order in Council P. C. 8527.
57bServices include: those rendered by public utilities; transportation; warehousing;
undertaking and embalming; laundering, cleaning, tailorhig, and dressmaking; hair-
dressing; repairing of all kinds; the supplying of meals and drinks; the exhibition of
motion pictures; and plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, and renovating; together
with "any activities or undertakings that may hereafter be designated by the Board
as services for the purposes of these regulations."
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tions and Supply; of personal effects; of deeds, securities, and commercial
paper; and of goods at bona fide auctions.
Canada, it would appear, has now traveled even further than the mother
country down the pathway of rigid price-control.
The War Measures Act, the basis for the price control exercised by the
government, was held by the Privy Council in Manitoba Free Press Co. v.
Fort Frances Pvlp and Paper Co.58 to be within the power of the Dominion
under Section 91 of the British North America Act (the Canadian Con-
stitution).
The War Measures Act gives the Dominion Executive almost unlimited
powers, including the power to receive from the Dominion Parliament the
latter's legislative authority, such as has been delegated in the War Measures
Act.5 9 Thus there would appear to be little basis for challenging the price
control measures the King government has taken.
IV. PRICE CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE BEGINNING
OF THE PRESENT EMERGENCY
On May 25, 1940, the President issued an administrative order establish-
ing the Office for Emergency Management, which he had provided for in
Executive Order No. 8248 on April 8, 1939, issued pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Reorganization Act of April 3, 1939.60 This office, under the
Administrative Order of May 25, 1940,61 and a later order issued on January
7, 1941, became the agency through which the President might co-ordinate,
supervise and direct the national defense activities of agencies, public or
private, and the channel of communications between such agencies and the
President.6 2 The second administrative order further provided that the work
and activities of the Council of National Defense, its Advisory Commission
and all subordinate bodies and agents should be co-ordinated in and through
58[1923] A. C. 695.
69As was said in In re Gray (1918) 57 S. C. R 150 at 167 and 170:
"The authority . . . is a lawmaking authority, that is to say, an authority
(within the scope and subject to the conditions prescribed) to supercede the
existing law whether resting on statute or otherwise . . . the true view of the
effect of this type of legislation is that the subordinate body in which the law-
making authority is vested by it is intended to act as the agent or organ of the
legislature and that the acts of the agent take effect by virtue of the antecedent
legislative declaration (expressed or implied) that they shall have the force of
law."
On this point, see also Manitoba Free Press Co. v. Fort Frances Pulp and Paper Co.,
mepra note 58.
6053 STAT. 561 (1939), 5 U. S. C. § 133 (Supp. 1940).
61For text, see 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv. ff 2601 (1941).
621 C. C. H. War Law Serv. II 2602 (1941).
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the Office for Emergency Management under the direction and supervision
of the President,
On April 11, 1941, by Executive Order No. 8734,63 the President created
the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply [ (OPACS), changed
to the Office of Price Administration (OPA) by Executive Order No. 8875,
promulgated August 28, 1941] as a part of the Office for Emergency Man-
agement of the Executive Office of the President to:
"a. take all lawful steps necessary or appropriate in order (1) to
prevent price spiraling, rising costs of living, profiteering, and inflation
... speculative accumulation, withholding, and hoarding of materials and
commodities;
"c. determine and publish, after proper investigation, such maxi-
mum prices, commissions, margins, fees, charges, or other elements of
cost or price of materials or commodities, as the Administrator may from
time to time deem fair and reasonable; and take all lawful and appro-
priate steps to facilitate their observance;
"h. recommend to the President the exercise of the authority vested
in him by the following named Acts, whenever, in the opinion of the
Administrator, such action by the President will enable the Administra-
tor to carry out and secure 'compliance with the provisions of Section
2 (a) and 2 (c) of this Order... ;64
"i. perform the functions and exercise the authority vested in the
President by the following named Acts,6 insofar as and only to the
631 C. C. H. War Law Serv. fff1 11, 551-67 (1941).
64The Acts mentioned are Section 9 of the Selective Training and Service Act of
September 16, 1940, Pub. L. No. 783, 76th Cong., 50 U. S. C. § 309 (Supp. 1940) (em-
powering the President to place an order with any firm and requiring such firm to comply
with such orders, just compensation to be paid) ; Section 120 of the National Defense
Act of June 3, 1916, 39 STAT. 214, 50 U. S. C. § 80 (1928). 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv.
fT 10, 551 (1941) (empowering the President in time of war or when war is imminent to
place an order with any firm and requiring the firm to comply with such order for a rea-
sonable price "as determined by the Secretary of War" upon penalty of having his plant
taken over and, upon conviction, being punished by imprisonment and fine) ; Section 1
(15) of Act of February 4, 1887, 24 STAT. 379, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (15) (1939), 1 C. C. H.
War Law Serv. ff 7203 (1941) (authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to
establish priorities in car service and transportation, to suspend rules regarding car service
and to make other rules whenever in its opinion a shortage of equipment or other emer-
gency requiring immediate action exists in any section of the country) ; and the Act of
October 10, 1940, Pub. L. No. 829, 76th Cong., 54 STAT. - (empowering the President
to requisition or take over military or naval equipment or munitions or machinery, tools,
materials, or supplies necessary for the manufacture, service, or operation thereof, which
have been ordered or manufactured for export purposes, and the export of which has
been denied by law).65 The Acts specified are: 53 STAT. 1407 (1939), 15 U. S. C. § 713(a)-7 (Supp. 1940)
(relating to the exchange, by treaty, of surplus agricultural commodities for stocks of
strategic and critical materials produced abroad and the release of strategic and critical
materials upon the order of the President) ; Section 5 of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation Act as amended by Pub. L. No. 664, 76th Cong. (June 25, 1940) 54 STAT.
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extent that the authority conferred by such Acts will, in the opinion of
the Administrator, enable him to carry out and secure compliance with
the provisions of Section 2 (a) and 2 (c) of this Order."
More than a year before the creation of OPACS, the President created
a Price Stabilization Division, charged with directing efforts and price stabili-
zation in the raw material field, as a subordinate body of the Council of
National Defense. An Office of Price Administration bad been set up in
this Division. On February 17, 1941, it issued its first price schedule, set-
ting maximum prices for second-hand machine tools.0 6 This Office issued five
price schedules6 7 before its functions were taken over by OPACS. These
schedules were adopted by Mr. Henderson, the Administrator of OPACS6
Thirty-four price schedules had-been issued by the Office of Price Adminis-
tration and the Price Stabilization Division up to October 4, 1941.
Each schedule states the reasons for its adoption, and then purports to
forbid persons either to buy or to sell the articles covered at more than the
maximum prices set."9
All schedules examined have carried an "enforcement" paragraph to the
effect that OPACS will endeavor to inform Congress and the public of any
violation and to assure that the powers of the government are fully exerted
-, 15 U. S. C. § 605 (Supp. 1940) (relating to loans by the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation) ; and Section 4 of the act approved June 7, 1939, 53 STAT. 811, 50 U. S. C.
§ 98c (Supp. 1940) (relating to the purchase, storing, and use of strategic materials which
can be used only upon the order of the President in time of war or when he finds that a
national emergency exists).66Release No. PM. 76, 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv. p. 11651 (1941).67Price Schedule No. 2, relating to aluminum scrap and secondary aluminum ingot
issued March 24, 1941, Release No. PM 186, 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv. 11 11655 (1941) ;
Price Schedule No. 3, relating to zinc scrap material and secondary zinc slab issued
March 31, 1941, Release No. PM 219, 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv. 1 11661 (1941) ; Price
Schedule No. 4, relating to iron and steel scrap, issued May 3, 1941, Release No. PM 226,
1 C. C. H. War Law Serv. 11 11665 (1941); and Price Schedule No. 5, relating to
bituminous coal, issued April 2, 1941 (revoked May 1, 1941), Releases Nos. PM 228 and
PM 351, 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv. 1111 11675 and 11677 (1941).68See memorandum of General Counsel of Office of Price Administration dated May
8, 1941, and printed in Hearing before Committee on Agriculture and Foresty, 77th Cong.
1st Sess. (May 29, 1941) 12.
69Price Schedule No. 2, for example, begins as follows: "Now, therefore, in order
to facilitate cooperation with the Government in maintaining price stability and in
preventing excessive and speculative price increases injurious to the defense program
and to the public interest and welfare, it is directed that,
"1302.1 maximum prices on sales of aluminum scrap by the maker of the scrap. On and
after March 25, 1941, except as provided in paragraph 5 below, regardless of the terms
of any commitment theretofore entered into, no maker of aluminum scrap shall sell, offer
to sell, deliver or transfer at a price, aluminum scrap made by him at prices higher than
the prices set forth in Column I of Appendix A, attached to this schedule, and no person
shall buy, or offer to buy, aluminum scrap from the maker of such aluminum scrap at
higher prices. Lower prices than those set forth in Column I of Appendix A may,
however, be charged, demanded, paid or offered." 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv. 11 11655
(1941), 6 F. R. 4076.
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to protect the interest of the public and of persons conforming to the
schedule. Citizens are asked to report violators. 70
The authority of the Office of Price Administration to issue such price
sohedules has been vigorously challenged71 and as vigorously defended.7 2
The attack upon the price schedules is grounded primarily upon the argu-
ment that the chief executive, even in an emergency, has no price-fixing
authority unless it is delegated to him by the Congress.
The defense is not of "price-fixing." It is strictly limited to sustaining
"the announcement" or "the issuance" of price schedules. It is asserted that
this authority is derived from Congressional acceptance of the exercise of
similar authority in World War I, from the re-enactment of the commandeer-
ing provision of the Army Appropriation Act of June 3, 1916,7 3 by Section 9
of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, from the implied consti-
tutional powers of the chief executive during a period of emergency, and from
his obligation "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. '74
It is submitted that the Office of Price Administration has the power to
issue its price schedules, but for somewhat different reasons than those
assigned.
The claim that World '"Tar I price-fixing during less than two years is "a
factor indicating the existence of authority" finds little support in author-
ity.71 United States v. Midwest Oil Company,76 cited to support the propo-
sition, was concerned with a usage extending over more than eighty years.
As the Court points out in the Midwest Oil Company case, 77 an element
necessary to turn a usage into a power is a claim of the power. Both the
president and the War Industries Board urged Congress to give the presi-
dent the full price-fixing authority7 8-in itself the negation of a claim to
the power.
7OSee, for example, 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv. 11 11656 (1941), at p. 11658.71See, for example, memorandum opinion of Senator Robert Taft to the effect that
the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration is without authority to fix prices.
Hearing before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 29,
1941) 45.72Memorandum of General Counsel of Office of Price Administration dated May 8,
1941, loc. cit. supra, note 68.
7339 STAT. 213, 214 (1916), 50 U. S. C. § 80 (1928).
74Memorandum of General Counsel of Office of Price Administration reprinted in
Hearings before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (May
29, 1941) 11-23.75Memorandum of General Counsel, Hearing before Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 29, 1941) 13.
76236 U. S. 459, 35 Sup. Ct. 309 (1915).
77236 U. S. at 469.75Minutes of the War Industries Board, Senate Committee Print No. 4, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Dec. 5, 1917) 149-150; Address before Congress, December 4, 1917, Official
Bulletin (December 4, 1917) 3.
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Furthermore, the practice in the Wilson administration was quite different
from that being followed today. As previously pointed out, price-fixing was
conducted by agreement, with few exceptions, even though the agreement
was obtained by the threat to exercise a power which the government had
a right to exercise. In World War II, the practice is the issuance of price
schedules. The one practice would seem to be too dissimilar to serve as a
precedent for the other.
The argument that Congress acquiesced in the exercise of the president's
authority in 1917 and 1918, and that as a consequence, the authority has
come into being, is likewise unconvincing. No acceptance or acquiescence by
the Congress of what President Wilson did in 1917 and 1918 is shown. It is
true that the Nye Committee, the War Policies Commission (the latter com-
posed of both congressmen, senators, and cabinet officers, with a cabinet
officer as chairman), and a special Senate Committee on the Investiga-
tions of the Munitions Industry considered World War I price-fixing
without denouncing the course followed by a president no longer alive.
Silent recognition of a fait accompli two decades old hardly should
be taken as a grant of power, or even of approval of its exercise, even if
these committees could speak for the Congress. It is a novel theory of con-
stitutional law that would make it possible for one of the branches of govern-
ment by failing to protest the exercise over a short period of a power by
another branch to bestow that power upon that other branch.
Because the commandeering statute 9 is said to have been re-enacted, with
slight change, in Section 9 of the Selective Training and Service Act, 1940,0
and further because this commandeering statute was invoked during 1917
and 1918 as an ultimate sanction supporting the maximum prices announced
as applicable on all sales, it is argued that Congress has, in effect, adopted
the 1917-1918 practice. During World War I, however, the commandeering
provisions were never relied upon, or considered, as authorizing the announce-
ment of maximum prices. The doctrine that by re-enactment of a statute
Congress means to give it the interpretation placed upon it by the executive
branch has no application, because the executive branch never interpreted
the statute as authorizing either the fixing of prices or the announcement of
price schedules. Furthermore, re-enactment does not adopt the executive's
construction unless the prior statute was itself ambiguous.81 The com-
mandeering statute furnishes no support to the present exercise of power.
79Act of June 3, 1916, § 120, 39 STAT. 213, 214 (1916), 50 U. S. C. § 80 (1928).
80Act of September 16, 1940, 54 STAT. -, 50 U. S. C. App. § 309 (Supp. 1940). It
appears from the U. S. Code that Section 120 was never repealed. See also Opinion of
the Attorney General to the President of the Senate, August 27, 1940, 1 C. C. H. War
Law Serv. f1 2222 (1941) p. 2212. If so, was it reenacted?8lChicago and A. R. Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. C1. 463 (1914).
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The remaining argument is that the president has the implied power to
issue ceiling price schedules.
The argument over whether the executive has any powers, apart from
those specifically given him in Article II of the Constitution, is older than
the Constitution itself. Alexander Hamilton took the view that there were
such powers, subject to the exceptions and qualifications expressed in the
Constitution.8 2
Upon the doctrine of implied powers was rested the holding of the Supreme
Court that Neagle, when he killed judge Terry, was acting pursuant to law,
and hence had the right to a writ of habeas corpus.83  The executive branch
has been permitted to endorse a bill of exchange without express prior
statutory authority,8 4 and to demand, receive, and sue upon a bond not
prescribed by statute.8 5 The Secretary of Interior was, without statutory
authority, held empowered to make rules and regulations to protect timber
on public land.88 In United States v. San Jacinto Tin Compawny,87 the Attor-
ney General was held empowered under the Constitution to bring suit to
set aside a patent issued by fraud. The same power was invoked in In re
Debs8 8 to sustain the bringing of an injunction suit under the anti-trust
laws, without express authority from Congress, to end the Pullman strike.89
824 T E WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Lodge Edition) 438.
8 31n re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658 (1890). In this case, the Court asked,
rhetorically, whether the phrase in the Constitution requiring the Chief Executive to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed" was "limited to the enforcement of Acts of
Congress or of treaties of the United States according to their expressed term, or does
it include the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our
international relations and all the protection implied by the nature of the Government
under the Constitution?" The Court did not expressly answer the question in the
affirmative. It did so, however, by implication.
S4Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 170, 4 L. ed. 362 (1818).
8 5 United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 115, 8 L. ed. 67 (1831). The Court said (5
Pet. at p. 122): "If the United States are competent to become parties to such a
bond without legislative requisitions, it is equally true that the right to dirept or
require such a bond belongs to the Executive. It is a part of its Constitutional
power; nor does the circumstance that the authority of the legislature may also direct
the taking of a particular bond negative the existence of such a power. The President
is enjoined 'to take care that the laws be faithfully executed'. In the performance of
this trust he not only may, but is bound to avail himself of every appropriate means not
forbidden by law. When a law is passed authorizing the the appointment of an officer,
or appropriating money to be disbursed under the direction of the President, are not the
duties of the Executive such as to impose upon him the appointment of agents to perform
the trusts reposed in him? . . .This bond was taken under the direction of the President
to secure the performance of the trust committed to the officer; in the language of the
Constitution to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed'. If the means be
appropriate to the end, does not the injunction to use such means flow from the Con-
stitution, and is it not, therefore, imperative? Could Congress increase the obligation
or give greater validity to the Act by reiterating the mandate?"
8 GWells v. Nickels, 104 U. S. 444, 26 L. ed. 825 (1881).
87125 U. S. 273, 8 Sup. Ct. 850 (1888).
88158 U. S. 564, 586, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895).
8 9 See also United States v. Knox, 128 U. S. 230, 9 Sup. Ct. 63 (1888) ; Heckman v.
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As has been frequently pointed out, President Lincoln, without statutory
authority and while Congress was not in session, turned the militia into a
volunteer army, added 23,000 men to the regular army and 18,000 men to
the navy, pledged the credit of the United States for a quarter of a billion
dollars, paid out two million dollars of unappropriated funds, suspended the
writ of habeas corpus, closed the post office "to treasonable correspondence,"
caused numerous persons to be arrested, and blockaded the southern ports.90
The president's power to establish martial law outside the zone of military
action was, however, held to be non-existent in Ex Parte Milligan.91 But
his power to blockade the southern ports without a declaration of war having
been made by Congress was upheld in the Prize Cases92 and his discretion
held to be a wide one: "whether the conditions justified the President's actions
was a question to be decided by him and no judicial court has jurisdiction
to review his determination."
On the other hand, no less authority than former President and Chief
Justice Taft has held that the president has no implied or emergency powers.
93
Even those disagreeing with Mr. Taft agree that the president gains no "war
power" from his power as commander-in-chief except the power of com-
manding the armies and fleet which Congress has caused to be raised.
The prevailing view seems to be, however, that the president takes from
the delegation to him by the Constitution of the executive power and from
the constitutional injunction "to take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted" some authority that extends beyond the powers expressly given him.
This authority permits him to adopt means "appropriate to the end" to carry
out broad policies laid down by Congress or within the scope of powers ex-
pressly given him. And he is, to a considerable extent, the judge of the
appropriateness of the means used. This is not to say that he can assume
the powers of the legislature or the judicial functions; but within the broad
limits of the executive power, he may act without express constitutional
mandate.
Does this penumbra of power extend to the issuance of ceiling price
schedules ?
The nation is today making its most gigantic war effort in history, an
United States, 224 U. S. 413, 32 Sup. Ct. 424 (1912) ; 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 28; 4 Op. Att'y
Gen. 248; 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 220, 446.9 0 CoRwIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, (1940) 157; and see proclamations
of April 15, and May 3, 1861, 6 RIcnARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,
(1908) 13-16; message of July 4, 1861, id. at 20-31; special message of May 26, 1862,
id. at 77-79; message of February 14, 1862, id. at 102-104; and id. at 23-25, 31, 7-27.
914 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281 (1866).
922 Black 635, 17 L. ed. 459 (1863).
93 See TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS (1925) 125-127.
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effort that already is absorbing 15% of the national income,94 calling for
the expenditure of 56 billion dollars and completely dislocating our peace-
time economic system. 95 The War and Navy Departments have become the
largest purchasers of goods and services in the nation, both directly and in-
directly, as a result of express directions, appropriations, and authorizations
from the Congress. Various departments of the government are competing
with one another for goods and services as the result of increase in the cost
of defense to the government and in the dislocation of markets. It would
seem only appropriate that some agency of the executive branch, charged with
the execution of the will of Congress, should have the power to advise the
various purchasing divisions, as well as those dealing with those divisions,
what are reasonable prices for necessary goods. And inasmuch as the price
of necessary articles is bound up inextricably with prices of general com-
modities, it would seem but appropriate that the power to proclaim the
executive views as to what are reasonable prices would extend to all com-
modities and, if necessary, to services.
It is not necessary, however, to go this far to sustain the announcement
of maximum prices by the Office of Price Administration. As has been
previously pointed out, the executive order creating the Office for Emergency
Management provided for the co-ordination, through that Office, of the
work and activities of the Council of National Defense. That Council, with
its subordinate agencies, has the duty9 6 to investigate with respect to prac-
tically all matters relating to national defense, to give information to pro-
ducers and manufacturers as to the requirements relating to supplies needed
for defense, and to create (or to make recommendations with respect to the
creation of) relations which will render possible in time of need the immedi-
ate concentration and utilization of the national resources.
The statutory authority given to the Council and to its subordinate bodies
would seem ample to warrant the investigation of, and report of the findings
on, prices. While OPA was not organized by the Council as a subordinate
body, it is linked to it, in many respects is subordinate to it, and would seem
entitled to exercise the powers conveyed.
The National Defense Council statute does not, of course, go so far as to
direct, or authorize, the price information to be put in the form of price
schedules bearing the indicia of commands to both buyers and sellers. Nor
does it appear that such orders are authorized by the express terms of the
executive order creating the Office of Price Administration. But if authority
to issue the information exists, the form in which it was issued woiild
94Release of Office of Price Administration, Oct. 22, 1941, PM 1421.
95See Washington Post, Oct. 26, 1941, p. 1.
96Under the Act of August 29, 1916, 39 STAT. 649, 50 U. S. C. §§ 1-5 (1928).
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hardy illegalize either the information or the organization that collected it.
The form of order may be a "trap for the unwary" profiteer and an unfair
attempt to give the appearance of power where none is known to exist, but
it hardly makes the dissemination of maximum price information beyond
the pale of the law.
Senator Taft has objected that enforcement of the price schedules by
commandeering is "purely and simply Government blackmail." 97 But as a
general rule, as Mr. Justice Holmes stated in Vegelahn v. Guntner,9 8 "What
you may do in a certain event you may threaten to do, that is give warning
of your intention to do in that event, and thus allow the other person the
chance of avoiding the consequences." Provided the conditions of the com-
mandeering statutes were met, it would appear clear that the president might
legally exercise any of the powers therein contained, irrespective of his
motive. And were he to commandeer the plant of a price-schedule "violator,"
the latter would be entitled to just compensation. To threaten requisition of
a plant as a means of enforcing price orders does not constitute duress.99
If the executive has the power to enforce its price announcements, it gets
its authority not from the announcements nor from the investigations in back
of them but from the congressional grant to commandeer. The government
may not be turning square corners with the citizen, but it is not "black-
mailing" him.
Senator Taft would seem to be sound in his view that the Office of Price
Administration has neither constitutionally nor by statute the power to fix
prices, that is to say, to make price orders, the violation of which is unlawful
and which measure the rights of citizens in their dealings with each other.
The fixing of prices, traditionally, is a legislative function.100 Whenever the
price-fixing power, to the extent it has existed, has been exercised, it has
been exercised by the Congress or the state legislatures., 0 The legislative
97Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(May 29, 1941) 47.
98167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896).
9 9 Cf. American Smelting Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 75, 42 Sup. Ct. 420 (1922);
United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 115, 8 L. ed. 66 (1831).
o0OSt. Louis Terminal Ass'n v. United States, 266 U. S. 17, 45 Sup. Ct. 5 (1924);
Pacific Gas and E. Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 537 (1923) ; Prentis
v. Atlantic Coastline Ry., 211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67 (1908) ; Minnesota Rate Cases,
230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1912).
' 01Even before the adoption of the Constitution, such price-fixing powers as were used
were always exercised by the legislative branch either directly or by delegation of
authority. State Regulation of Prices (1920) 33 HAlv. L. Rav. 838-841; McAllister,
Price Control by Law in the United States: A Survey (1937) 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
273-300. For example of cases involving legislative price fixing, see Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, 24 L. ed. 94 (1877) ; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24
L. ed. 77 (1877) ; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391, 38 L. ed. 757 (1877) ; German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914). See also as examples
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power of the United States was conferred by the Constitution exclusively
upon the Congress. This power embraces all thefunctions of the state and
all the functions of government not expressly or impliedly delegated to
other branches or expressly withheld from the legislative branch.10 2 The
legislative function, subject to constitutional restriction, extends to the
making of all new rules for the regulation of future conduct, 0 3 and it
would seem that the establishment of rules decreeing prices to be charged
is plainly within that function. The fact that the price-fixing power
was, at the time of adoption of the Constitution, exercised by the legislative
branch would be enough to stamp it as legislative in character. 0 4 Further,
even had this power not originally resided in the legislature, the long con-
tinued and uninterrupted exercise of this power by the Congress with the
acquiescence of the other branches, would lodge it there.10 5
The fact of the emergency would not cause a shift of the authority. As
Corwin has pointed out, 06 "the power of dealing with national emergencies
is an inherent power in the National Government as a whole, not in a part
thereof, and it is subject in its exercise to the methods and procedures which
are laid down in the Constitution."
No congressional authority having yet been given the executive branch
to fix prices in this emergency, OPA has hardly the legal power to do more
than to announce its price schedules, to urge compliance therewith, and when
violations occur, to bring pressure to bear through other departments exe-
cuting express congressional mandates.O7 But its "announcement" and
of early exercise of price fixing power by Congress, 3 STAT. 587, § 7 (1820) (regulating
wharfage rates and rates for sweeping chimneys in the District of Columbia) ; 9 STAT.
224, § 2 (1848) (regulating charges for carriages in the District of Columbia). It has
long been recognized that the legislative branch alone can delegate price fixing authority
to a municipal corporation. A municipal corporation has no power to fix prices unless
the legislature delegates that power to it. Greene v. Fitchburg, 219 Mass. 121, 106 N. E.
573.
' 0 2Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14, 1 L. ed. 721, 723 (1799) ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch
87, 3 L. ed. 162 (1810) ; Bridgeport Public Library v. Burroughs, 85 Conn. 309, 82 Atl.
582 (1912); Woodruff v. New York Ry., 59 Conn. 63, 20 Atl. 17 (1890); Mayor v.
State, 15 Md. 479 (1890).
1O3 People v. Roth, 249 Ill. 532, 94 N. E. 953 (1911) ; Schaake v. Dottey, 85 Kan. 598,
118 Pac. 80 (1911).
104 Leavenworth County v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479 (1871); Booth v. Commonwealth, 130
Ky. 88, 113 S. W. 61 (1908).
' 0 5 United States v. Mid West Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 35 Sup. Ct. 309 (1915).
106CoRwix, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS (1940) 133.
107OPA has, in two cases, sought to persuade a bankruptcy court to exercise its
equitable jurisdiction to protect the public interest to the extent of refusing to confirm
sales above ceiling prices, In the Matter of the Bender Body Co. (N. D. Ohio) No.
55795, and to instruct referees'or trustees not to sell above ceiling prices, 1n re Oliver
C. Riggs, Bankruptcy No. 21,858 (E. D. Pa.). In the former case, the government has
filed a petition to intervene and by stipulation between counsel, part of the proceeds of
the sales, some of which were made above price ceilings established by OPA, have been
impounded pending a decision by the court on the merits and on the question of the
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"issuance" of price schedules would seem to be justified both as a discharge
of part of the constitutional obligation of the president to take care that the
defense program Congress has laid down be executed, and as an exercise
of the statutory powers of the National Defense Council and its subordinate
bodies.
V. SOME CONSTITUTIONAL AsPEcTs OF PRICE-CONTROL
The final form of the price-control measure had not been determined at
the time this article went to press. A discussion of the constitutionality of
price-fixing, therefore, must perforce be general in nature.
A. Congress Ha s Power to Fix Prices in Aid of National Defense
Notwithstanding the fact that World War I did not definitely settle the
question, 08 little doubt would now seem to exist that, assuming appropriate
methods are employed, the Congress has, even before the actual commence-
ment of hostilities, the power to fix maximum prices. This power may be
derived from the "war power" and probably from the commerce power. It
can be plausibly argued that it exists under the power of Congress to coin
money and regulate the value thereof. 0 9
right of the government to intervene. The sales have been confirmed subject to the
stipulation. In the latter case, the court refused, on the ground of short notice, to
instruct the receiver, but a sale below the ceiling prices rendered the question moot. The
court did, however, allow the government formally to intervene. The Comptroller Gen-
eral has held, however, that the Federal Prison Industries, in selling scrap material,
may not reject bids in excess of ceiling prices established by OPA, Comp. Gen. Dec.
B-20689, Oct. 13, 1941, 10 U. S. LAW WEEK 2261. Nor can the governmental agency
refuse to solicit cash bids, even though by limiting the bids to bids to exchange new
material for that offered for sale, it might avoid receiving bids above the ceilings. The
decision was rested on the conclusion that "there appears nothing in the statutes relating
to Federal Prison Industries, Inc., which reasonably could be construed as authorizing
the rejection of the highest cash bids under the circumstances presented." The Comp-
troller-General followed the reasoning employed by him in Decision B-15941, 20 Comp.
Gen. 703, 9 U. S. LAw WEEK 2686, holding that the Navy Department could not relieve
a successful bidder of its obligation to purchase scrap materials because the bid price
was in excess of the ceiling price established after acceptance of the bid, but before
performance. In that decision, it was pointed out that the United States as a con-
tractor is not liable for its acts as a sovereign, and that a sovereign is not affected by
statutory provisions or administrative orders unless expressly named therein or included
by implication.0 8 As stated hereinbefore, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the Constitutional
question in Addy Co. v. United States, 264 U. S. 239, 44 Sup. Ct. 300 (1924). Not-
withstanding this, the validity of price fixing seems to have been assumed in United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 622, 51 Sup. Ct. 570 (1931), wherein the court said:
"To the end that war may not result in defeat, freedom of speech may, by Act of Congress,
be curtailed or denied . . . prices of foods and other necessities of life fixed or regulated;
railways taken over and operated by the Government; and other drastic powers, wholly
inadmissible in times of peace, exercised to meet the emergencies of war."
109 Ginsberg, Legal Aspects of Price Control in the Defense Program, (1941) 27
A. B. A. J. 530, 531.
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1. The War Power of the Congress.-Congress is empowered by the Con-
stitution "to declare war," "to raise and support armies," "to provide and
maintain a navy," and "to make rules for the Government and regulation.
of the land and naval forces." It is empowered to tax "to provide for the
common defense," and "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any de-
partment or officer thereof.""u 0
The foregoing powers, as were pointed out many years ago by John
Quincy Adams,"' are plenary:
"Sir, in the authority given to Congress by the Constitution of the
United States to declare war, all the powers incidental to war are, by
necessity, implication, conferred upon the government of the United
States. Now the powers incidental to war are derived not from the
internal municipal sources, but the law and usages of nations ...
There are, then, in the authority of Congress and in the Executive, two
classes of powers altogether different in their nature and often incom-
patible with each other-war power and peace power. The peace power
is limited by regulations and restricted by provisions in the Constitution
itself. The war power is only limited by the usages of nations. The
power is tremendous. It is strictly constitutional, but it breaks down
every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty and of
life."
The war power was given Congress because the framers of the Constitu-
tion realized that "the very existence of the Nation might be at stake, and
that every resource of the people must be at command.""112 In that case
the Supreme Court said:
"Of course, the power to declare war involves the power to prosecute
it by all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately
prosecuted."
That power "permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in
a supreme co-operative effort to preserve the Nation."
113
It is for the Congress to decide what steps are required to wage a success-
ful war or to defend the nation successfully, and its discretion is not to be
interfered with.114 In fact, as Charles Evans Hughes pointed out in 1917,115
-loU. S. CONST. ART I, § 8.
" 'REGISTER OF DEBATES, XII, 4037-4038.
112Charles Evans Hughes, speaking before the American Bar Association on The
Fighting Powers of the United States under the Constitution, Report of the 40th Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association, 232-248. See also THE FEDERALIST, Nos.
XLI, XXVI, and XXIII; United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 51 Sup. Ct. 570
(1931) ; Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 20 L. ed. 135 (1871).
"13 Home Bldg. and L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934).
"14McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819). In that case the Court
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all "reasonable regulations to safeguard the resources upon which we depend
for military success must be regarded as being within the powers confided
to Congress to enable it to prosecute a successful war."
The "war" or "national defense" power of the Congress was held to ex-
tend to operation of the railroads 16 and of the telegraph and telephone sys-
tems,"17 to draft man power," 8 to place compulsory orders for materials, 119
to put into effect prohibition after the Armistice had been signed,' 20 and to
acquire the Gettysburg Battlefield.' 2 1 None of these acts would seem more
far-reaching than price-fixing, if the latter could be shown to have reason-
able relation to national defense.
The importance to national defense today of the price structure is too
plain to require any considerable argument. As previously stated, about
15% of the national resources has been devoted to defense production. The
total defense program to date calls for expenditures of approximately fifty-
six billions of dollars.122 By June 30, 1942, approximately seventeen bil-
lion will have been spent, and in the fiscal year, 1943, 26 billion more out of
a national income not exceeding 105 billion dollars will be devoted to de-
fense.1 Even before defense spending began to hit its stride, prices began
their upward spiral. From the outbreak of war to August, 1941, the whole-
sale price index in this country increased 20.4%. The cost of living index
has shown a 9.6% rise above the August, 1939, level.' 2 4  By the end of
said (4 Wheat. at 421, 4 L. ed. at p. 605): "We admit, as all must admit, that the
powers of the Government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended,
but we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legis-
lature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to
be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties
assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. That the end be legitimate,
that it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." In Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. at
506, 20 L. ed. at 179, the Court said:
"The measures to be taken in carrying on war and to suppress insurrection,
are not defined. The decision of all such questions rests wholly in the discretion
of those to whom the substantial powers involved are confided by the Con-
stitution."
Highland v. Russell Car and Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 314 (1928) ;
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 163, 40 Sup. Ct. 106 (1919);
Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 20 L. ed. 176 (1871).
115Report of the 40th annual meeting of the American Bar Association, (1917) p. 247.
116Northern Pac. R. R. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 39 Sup. Ct. 502 (1919).
117Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 39 Sup. Ct. 507 (1919).
18 Selective Draft Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159 (1917).
"19Moore & Tierney, Inc. v. Rockford Knitting Co., 265 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 2d 1920).
120Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106 (1919).
121United States v. Gettysburg Electric Co., 160 U. S. 668, 16 Sup. Ct. 427 (1896).
122 See Office of Production Management release PM 1442 (Oct. 25, 1941).
123See Office of Production Management release PM 1442 (Oct. 25, 1941).
124See Office of Production Management release PM 1421 (Oct. 22, 1941).
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June, 1941, the Bureau of Labor Statistics daily index of the spot prices
of 28 basic commodities advanced to 150% of its level in August, 193-9, a
rise of about 24% in less than six months. More than half of the increase
in the general level of wholesale prices has come within the past four months,
during which the defense program has begun to "take hold."
Price increases and high cost of living not only undermine morale ;125 they
also greatly and unnecessarily increase the cost to the government of prepa-
rations for national defense.'
20
The necessity of price control as a war measure has been recognized by
chambers of commerce, Senate committees, the War Policies Commission,
and in the industrial mobilization plans prepared by the War Department and
in the experience of foreign countries.1
27
The reasonable relation of price-fixing to a successful defense would seem
easily demonstrable.
The fact that a declared state of war does not now exist does not diminish
the right of Congress to control prices. Neither reason nor precedent sup-
ports a view that in a period of history when the Battle of France was lost
on the assembly lines three years before it began the Congress is powerless
to act until the enemy is at our gates. In a much simpler day Congress could,
as a war measure, place an embargo on commerce in time of peace.12 8  It has
been permitted, under the war power, to constru'ct a dam in peace time to
strengthen defense,'1 29 to build highways for national defense,130 and to
exercise the power of eminent domain to establish a battleground as a means
125See statement of Bernard Baruch, War Policies Commission Hearing, held pursuant
to Public Res. No. 98, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., 812-813, and address of President Wilson to
the mine operators and manufacturers of the United States, July 12, 1917, and 13
WASHINGTON'S WITINGS, 382-383.
' 2GIt is estimated that the cost to the government of the World War was increased by
15 billions of dollars because of price inflation. See BARUcH, AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN
THE WAR (1941) 447-453.
1
2 7 See 20 EQUITY (1918) 61-62; Report of the Special Committee on Control of
Prices during the War, appointed by the U. S. Chamber of Commerce; War Policies
Commission, Hearing, 812-813; Taussig, Price-Fixing as Seen by a Price-Fixer (1919) 33
Q. J. OF EcON., 205, 240; Report of The House Committee on Military Affairs on H. R.
119, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 9; Industrial Mobilization Plan, revision of 1939, SEN.
Doc. No. 139, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939) ; Senate Munitions Committee Report on H.
R. 5529, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 26; SEN. REP. No. 944, Part 2, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935) 128; House Committee on Military Affairs, H. R. REP. No. 808, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) and H. R. REP. No. 1870, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1939) ; Senate Com-
mittee on Military Affairs, SEN. REP. No. 480, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
128 Cited in BLAKE, ]EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EMBARGO
LAWS, 56.
129Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 326-328, 56 Sup. Ct.
466 (1936).
'3SNashville, C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405, 417, 55 Sup. Ct. 486
(1938).
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of building up morale. 131 And its authority in the present time to draft men
has been upheld.'
32
From the foregoing, it would appear clear that the power to regulate
prices in the present emergency may lawfully be exercised by the Congress
under its war powers.
2. The Power to Fix Prices under the Commerce Clause.-While it is
less clear, recent decisions of the Supreme Court would seem to give the
Congress the power to fix prices under its commerce power. 33 The fixing
of prices upon articles or services in interstate commerce is not new.
Congress has fixed a wage scale 3 4 and railroad rates, 35 and regulated fees
and charges for livestock exchanges. 136 It has prevented price discrimina-
tion.137 It has even gone further, constitutionally, to bar completely from
interstate commerce, goods produced in violation of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act,138 and to regulate the labor relations of producers for interstate
commerce.' 39 Doubtless to sustain price control under the commerce clause
it would be necessary to show that price-fixing was reasonably necessary
in order to prevent undue burden upon interstate or foreign commerce or
the disruption of the orderly exchange of commodities in interstate com-
merce.1 40 Whether such a showing could be made in any particular case
would depend upon the circumstances. How far Congress could go to
fix retail prices, rents, or wages outside of the transportation field would
depend, presumably, upon the proof developed as to the burden produced
by these items on interstate commerce and as to their effect upon its orderly
flow.1 4' Those hoping for greater government control will, doubtless, prefer
to see general price legislation sustained on the basis of the commerce power.
a31United States v. Gettysburg Electric Co., 160 U. S. 668, 16 Sup. Ct. 427 (1896).
' 32Stone v. Christensen, 36 F. Supp. 739 (D. Ore. 1940) ; United States v. Rappaport,
36 F. Supp. 915 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) ; Herling v. United States, - F. (2d) -, (C. C. A.
2d June 21, 1941). Cf. Moore & Tierney, Inc. v. Rockford Knitting Co., 265 Fed. 177,
180 (C. C. A. 2d 1920).
133United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative Co., 307 U. S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993 (1939);
Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Atkins, 310 U. S. 381, 60 Sup. Ct. 907 (1940) ; United States
v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (1941).
134Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298 (1917).
135Louisville & National R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 190 U. S. 273, 23
Sup. Ct. 687 (1903).
136Tagg Bros. & Moorehead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220 (1930);
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1922).
137George Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct. 112
(1928).
1SUnited States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (1941).
' 39National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57
Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
14ONebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934).141United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative Co., 307 U. S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993 (1939),
and cases therein cited, 307 U. S. at 568-570.
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Those with contrary views will prefer a test on the war power alone. The
latter, certainly, is the broader and more dependable. A court need not, unless
it wishes, look beyond it for the necessary constitutional authority.
B. Price-Fixing and the Fifth Amendment
The power to fix prices, if in fact appropriate to either national defense
or to prevent burdens on interstate commerce, and assuming its exercise in
a reasonable way, would seem not to violate either the "due process" or "the
just compensation" clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
Both the war and the commerce powers of the Congress have been held
to be as broad, in their appropriate fields, as the police power of the states
raised to their highest degree.1 42 A state, it was held in Vebbia v. New
York, 43 may "regulate a business in any of its aspects, including the prices
to be charged for the products or commodities it sells," and "if the laws
passed seem to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose,
and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process
are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio."
The congressional freedom is no less great than is that of a state legis-
lature, especially when the "extraordinary circumstance of war," or threat
of war, may bring, as Charles Evans Hughes pointed out in his address in
1917 before the American Bar Association,1 4 4 "particular businesses and
enterprises fairly into the category of those which ar'e affected with the
public interest and which demand immediate and thoroughgoing public regu-
lation." At such a time, he said:
"The production and distribution of foodstuffs, articles of prime neces-
sity, those which have direct relation to military efficiency, those which
are absolutely required for the support of the people during the stress
of conflict, are plainly of this sort. Reasonable regulations to safe-
guard the resources upon which we depend for military success must be
regarded as being within the powers confided to Congress. . . .That
[war] power explicitly conferred and absolutely essential to the safety
of the Nation is not destroyed or impaired by any later provision of
the Constitution or by any one of the amendments."
In the exercise of the commerce power, the same test of "appropriateness
142United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, supra note 141; Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106 (1919) ; Second District v. N. Y. C. R. R.,
230 N. Y. 149, 129 N. E. 455; United States v. Gordin, 287 Fed. 565 (S. D. Ohio
1922); United States v. Casey, 247 Fed. 362 (S. D. Ohio 1918).
143291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934).
144Report of the 40th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (1917) 247.
[Vol. 27
PRICE CONTROL IN WARTIME
to the end" measures "due process." In Virginia Railway Co. v. Federation
No. 40,145 the Supreme Court said:
"Even though Congress, in the choice of means to affect a permissible
regulation of commerce, must conform to due process . . . it is evident
that where, as here, the means chosen are appropriate to the permissible
end, there is little scope for the operation of the due process clause."
The economic facts previously discussed indicate strongly that extensive
price-fixing is "appropriate to the permissible end" of national defense.
While for lack of sufficient knowledge of economic facts this writer is not
now prepared to say that general price-fixing is essential to the free flow
of commerce, it might well be proved to be. Certainly today it cannot be
said that there is anything inherent in the fixing of maximum prices which
violates the due process clause.
146
It has, of course, been argued that before the prices of a business can be
regulated it has to meet the test, which Mr. Justice Holmes balled "little more
than a fiction,"' 47 that the business be affected with a public interest. This
test was, however, discarded in Nebbia v. New York.148  The fact that a
buyer was not, as the defendant in Highland v. Russell Car and Snow Plow
Co.,1 49 engaged in a public use "for which coal and other private property
might have been taken by exertion of the power of eminent domain" should
not prevent the government from prescribing the maximum prices to be paid.
And satisfaction of the now outmoded test of "due process" laid down
in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.,15 0 i.e., that of
examining the "settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the com-
mon and statute law of England" which are not unsuited to the New World,
would be found in the almost continuous price-fixing activities of the pre-
Revolutionary War English governments and of colonial and new state legis-
latures, previously discussed.' 51
No emergency has yet been held to suspend the requirement that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 52 But,
as was held in Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States'"3 and Pine Hill Coal Co.
145300 U. S. 515, 558, 57 Sup. Ct. 592 (1937).
' 4 0Olsen v. Nebraska, 312 U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 862 (1941) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291
U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934).
147Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 446, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
148291 U. S. at 531-539.
149279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 314 (1928).
15018 How. 272, 276-7, 15 L. ed. 372 (1856).
15 See also authorities cited by Brandeis, J., in New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285
U. S. 262, 305-308, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
152United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623, 627, 628, 20 L. ed. 474 (1871).
'13259 U. S. 188, 42 Sup. Ct. 481 (1922).
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v. United States,154 the fixing of prices is "not a taking, and no law-making
power promises by implication to make good losses that may be incurred
by obedience to its commands." Even the entry into a contract with the
government at a fixed price, if voluntary, prevents a later claim of "a tak-
ing."'155 Doubtless, were property requisitioned by the federal government
itself, the seller would be entitled to have determined de novo the reasonable-
ness of the price set, since the measure of just compensation is a judicial
and not a legislative problem.' 56 Such a requirement may limit to some
extent the operation of a price-fixing statute; it would not appear to effect
its validity.
Were the Congress to require, as the English Price of Goods Act has, that
sellers may not refuse to sell their goods at the prices fixed, just compensa-
tion probably could be demanded from the government where the prices
fixed were held to be less than reasonable.15 But no such requirement is
contained in any measure so far proposed here. In England, of course, the
government may take property for war purposes without making just
compensation. 58
In the absence of a forced sale, however, the fixing of prices below those
at which some sellers might profitably sell would not seem to constitute a
"public taking." The fact that a regulation, otherwise valid, results in the
lessening of value of a property, 5 9 or prohibits the sale or a product,160 or
causes some other particular hardship' 61 does not constitute either "a taking"
or a violation of due process. No one has a constitutional right in a profit
from a sale set on an industry-wide or region-wide basis.
1 62
154259 U. S. 191, 42 Sup. Ct. 482 (1922).
155American Smelting etc. Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 75, 42 Sup. Ct. 420 (1922).
156Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 327, 13 Sup. Ct. 622
(1893).
157Highland v. Russell Car and Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 314 (1928) ;
Dupont de Nemours &,Co. v. Hughes, 50 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d 1931).
1581n re A Petition of Right [1915] 3 K. B. 649.
159Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106 (1919);
Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141 (1920).
16OPurity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 33 Sup. Ct. 44 (1912).
' 61Pierce Oil Co. v. Hope, 248 U. S. 498, 500, 39 Sup. Ct. 172 (1919) (upholding
ordinance requiring gasoline tanks to be stored outside city limits) ; United States v.
Hudson, 299 U. S. 498, 57 Sup. Ct. 309 (1937).
162United States v. Morgan, 312 U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 999 (1941); Tagg Bros. &
Moorehead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220 (1930) ; Hegeman Farms
Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 55 Sup. Ct. 7 (1934).
In the Hegeman Farms case, the Court said (293 U. S. at 169-170) : "The appellant's
grievance amounts to this, that it is operating at a loss, though other dealers more
efficient or economical or better known to the public may be operating at a profit. ...
The appellant would have us say that minimum prices must be changed whenever a par-
ticular dealer can show that the effect of the schedule in its application to himself is to
deprive him of a profit. This is not enough to subject administrative rulings to revision
by the courts. If the designation of a minimum price is within the scope of the police
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The distinction between the case of an ordinary business and that of a
public utility, whichmust be allowed to earn a fair return,163 is, of course,
that the public utility must continue to provide the services the rates for
which are fixed, which is not true in the case of the ordinary seller. And
even a public utility's right to earn dividends is not absolute if an unfair
rate is the alternative. 64
The foregoing is not to say that the Fifth Amendment could not be vio-
lated by price-fixing. Were the prices set so low as to give no or only a
very few sellers adequate returns, they probably would be arbitrary, un-
reasonable, and violative of due process. Unreasonable classifications of
goods, profit margins, or other actions either unnecessary or unduly disturb-
ing to normal business practices might be held beyond the constitutional pale.
Such actions, however, would not invalidate the acts of Congress or impair
the price-fixing power.
General price-fixing legislation, therefore, probably will survive the tests
of constitutionality. Some may doubt whether the Constitution wil survive
price-fixing. Others may be more concerned with the problem of weaving
such a war time measure inextricably into the fabric of governmental con-
trol. But the vast majority, concentrating primarily upon the attainment
of the goals set for them, will adhere to the price schedules whether fixed
by congressional mandate or not, or whether advised by their counsel that
they must or not. They will do this because fundamentally and eternally to
Americans good sound sense is "law," no matter what the law reviews now,
or the judges after the event, may say regarding its constitutionality.
power, expenses or losses made necessary thereby must be borne as an incident, unless
the order goes so far beyond the needs of the occasion as to be turned into an act of
tyranny. Nothing of the kind is charged." See also United States v. Adler's Creamery,
107 F. (2d) 987 (C. C. A. 2d 1939) ; Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U. S.
\126, 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (1941).
1'68 Smythe v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 526, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898).
' 64Reagan v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 412, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047
(1894); Covington and Lexington T. R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 596-97, 17
Sup. Ct. 198 (1896).
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